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In view of rising wage and income inequality, the introduction of a legal minimum wage has 
recently become an important policy issue in Germany. We analyze the distributional effects 
of a nationwide legal minimum wage of 7.50 € per hour on the basis of a microsimulation 
model which accounts for the complex interactions between individual wages, the tax-benefit 
system and net household incomes, also taking into account potential employment effects as 
well as indirect effects on consumption. Simulation results show that the minimum wage 
would be rather ineffective in raising net household incomes and reducing income inequality, 
even if it led to a substantial increase in hourly wages at the bottom of the wage distribution. 
The ineffectiveness of a minimum wage in Germany is mainly due to the existing system of 
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1  Introduction 
Germany is one of the few OECD countries where no general legal minimum wage currently exists 
(see Immervoll, 2007). However, in view of rising wage inequality, the introduction of a legal 
minimum wage has become an important policy issue in Germany. One argument for the introduc-
tion of a minimum wage is that the existing wage bargaining system no longer prevents ‘excessive’ 
downward wage flexibility. This is said to be related to the significant decline of union coverage in 
the economy and an expanding low wage sector partly as a result of recent labor market reforms in 
Germany. In this regard, a minimum wage prevents ‘unfair’ competition as a result of wage subsi-
dies aimed at increasing employment in the low-wage sector. Another argument is that earnings of 
people working full-time should be sufficient to cover at least the means-tested social minimum. In 
that respect, a minimum wage is a means to prevent the emergence of the so-called ‘working poor’.  
Whereas the extensive literature on the economic effects of minimum wages primarily fo-
cuses on their wage and employment effects (see, e.g., Brown, 1999; Neumark and Wascher, 2007), 
there has been comparatively little research on the important policy question to what extent mini-
mum wages affect the available income at the household level and thus the income distribution and 
inequality.
1 This literature, which mostly deals with the U.S., has shown that only a small fraction 
of families at the bottom of the income distribution includes workers that are employed at the 
minimum. Low income households often do not work at all or have only a single wage earner with 
the spouse caring for children. Therefore, a change of minimum wages is only weakly or not at all 
related to household income and has no significant effect on income inequality. In order to compre-
hensively analyze the potential income effects of minimum wages, the composition of households, 
the interplay of minimum wages and the tax-benefit system, as well as the adjustment of labor sup-
ply and demand have to be taken into account.  
For Germany, there are hitherto only a few explorative studies on the potential effects of a 
statutory minimum wage on the wage and income distribution. On the basis of data from the Ger-
man Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP), DIW (2006) documents that in West Germany very low 
wages are concentrated among marginally employed persons working few hours in jobs exempted 
from social security contributions (so-called ‘Mini jobs’), whereas in East Germany low-wage jobs 
are also common among regularly employed people. It is also shown that minimum wages would 
disproportionately affect employees working in small firms and certain sectors, in particular agri-
culture and services. The relationship between lower wages and low incomes is found to be rather 
                                                 
1   This literature includes Johnson and Browning (1983), Burkhauser et al. (1996), Burkhauser and Sabia (2005), 
Bluestone and Ghilarducci (1996), MaCurdy and McIntyre (2001); Neumark and Wascher (1997, 2000), Neumark 
(2008) for the US; Goldberg and Green (1999) for Canada; Gosling (1996) and Sutherland (2001) for the UK, and 
Knabe and Schöb for Germany (2008). OECD (1998) and Brown (1999) summarize the older literature.   
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weak since low wages contribute only a relatively small share to household incomes. Bosch and 
Weinkopf (2006) report similar results for full-time employed people on the basis of administrative 
employment register data. Using SOEP data for 2004, Kalina and Weinkopf (2007) show that about 
14 % of all dependent employed persons would have received a hypothetical minimum wage of 
7.50 € in Germany, with higher shares among unskilled workers, women, youth, and people in mar-
ginal employment. Also using SOEP data, Knabe and Schöb (2008) find that households eligible to 
means-tested unemployment benefits would, on average, not benefit from a minimum wage because 
of the high benefit-withdrawal rate implicit in the German social welfare system. A legal minimum 
wage of 7.50 € per hour has been suggested, inter alia, by the governing Social Democratic Party 
and the trade unions.  
In this paper we investigate the effects of the introduction of a nationwide minimum wage of 
7.50 € per hour on the distribution on household incomes and income inequality while taking labor 
demand and supply reactions into account. The next section provides some information on the evo-
lution of the low-wage sector as well as the relationship between low wages, means-tested income 
support and household incomes in Germany. Section 3 describes our methodological approach to 
estimate minimum wage effects on wages, employment, and ultimately net household income. In a 
first step, it is shown how a minimum wage in the suggested amount would affect the distribution of 
hourly wages abstracting from behavioral adjustments. To move from shifts in hourly wages to 
changes in net household incomes, we apply a microsimulation model based on the SOEP. This 
model accounts for the complexity of the German tax-benefits system, in particular means-tested 
income-support schemes, exemptions of very low earnings from social security contributions, and 
the joint income taxation of married couples imposing relatively high marginal tax rates on secon-
dary earners. In addition to the static simulation of income effects (‘first round effects’) we allow 
behavioral adjustments of labor supply and demand and calculate net household incomes after the 
adaptation of employment (‘second round effects’). Moreover, we analyze indirect effects of the 
minimum wage on consumer prices and on net household incomes, without and with the adjustment 
of consumption behavior. Simulation results, summarized in Section  4, show that the proposed 
minimum wage would have little impact on the overall distribution of net household incomes and 
the reduction of inequality among households with at least one low-wage worker. If negative effects 
on labor demand are taken into account the average effects on income are reduced by about 50 %. 
To a large extent the ineffectiveness of a minimum wage to increase net household incomes of the 
working poor and to reduce income inequality can be explained by the system of means-tested in-
come support already existing in Germany. Section 5 summarizes our main findings and concludes.  
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2  Wage and Income Inequality, and the “Implicit Minimum Wage” 
Policy proposals to introduce a legal minimum wage in Germany are often made with reference to 
the alleged increase in wage and income inequality as well as in the share of the working poor asso-
ciated with an expanding low-wage sector. These developments are often said to have especially 
affected women, who are disproportionately employed in low-wage jobs, and people in East Ger-
many due to the still much higher unemployment and comparably weak union coverage.  
Figure 1 documents the evolution of wage inequality between the mid-1990s and 2006 based 
on representative data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP, see Section 3). Changes in 
the overall wage inequality, as measured by the ratio between the median and the mean of the 
hourly wage distribution in the respective group of employed people (excluding the self-employed), 
is mainly driven by the increasing divergence between the median and wages at the bottom of the 
wage distribution, as measured by the ratio between the first decile (p10) and the median. The de-
cline in this wage ratio is particularly pronounced for men in West Germany and for both men and 
women in East Germany. By 2006, it had declined by a third to about 0.4 for men, which is roughly 
the same level as obtained by women in both regions. Except for women in West Germany, the de-
cline of the p10/median wage ratio was much more pronounced in this period than the one recorded 
for the p25/median ratio.  
The increasing share of low-wage employment, defined by an hourly wage of less than 50 % 
of the median, since the late 1990s, and in particular during the past few years, is documented in 
Figure 2. For men this share almost doubled in the observation period, reaching about 13 % in 
2006, but the incidence of low-wage employment has also been increasing substantially for women, 
especially in East Germany. This strong increase occurred well before the recent labor market re-
forms which improved financial incentives to take up low-wage jobs, as described below. 
The empirical evidence indeed seems to support the claim that inequality at the bottom of the 
wage distribution has been strongly increasing, and that this is related to an expanding share of low-
wage employment. Contrary to what is usually assumed, though, the empirical evidence also shows 
that men have been even more strongly affected by this development than women, and that the low-
wage sector has been expanding strongly in both West and East Germany. In terms of increasing 
income inequality, however, the situation is worse in East Germany, where – measured by the Gini 
coefficient – inequality has risen by more than 25% between 1995 and 2006 (see Table 1).
 2   
                                                 
2   The new OECD scale has been used for the calculation of equivalent income which gives a factor of 1 to the head of 
household, of 0.5 to each adult person and of 0.3 to each family member younger than 18. The Gini coefficient is a 
summary measure of inequality normalized between 0 (equal distribution of incomes) and 1 (all incomes received 
by one person).  
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1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
median/mean p25/median p10/median  
   Notes:  p10 is the 10
th percentile, p25 is the 25
th percentile of the wage distribution. Calculations are based on personal SOEP weights. Only employed people aged   
  18-65 are included, the self-employed are excluded. 
   Source:  Own calculations based on SOEP, waves 1995-2006.  
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1995 2000 2003 2006
men west men east women west women east  
Notes:  Low-wage share: share of people with an hourly wage < 0.5 median wage in the respective population 
subgroup (men in East Germany etc.). Only employed people aged 18-65 are included, the self-
employed are excluded. 
Source:  Own calculations based on SOEP, waves 1995-2006, using sampling weights. 
Table 1:  Gini coefficients, net household equivalent incomes by region, 1995-2006 
Year West  Germany  %Δ since 1995  East Germany  %Δ since 1995 
1995  0.2590   0.2002  
  (0.2470; 0.2710)    (0.1892; 0.2112)   
2000  0.2496 -3.62  0.2076  3.69 
  (0.2447; 0.2546)    (0.2018; 0.2134)   
2003  0.2841 9.68  0.2388  19.25 
  (0.2780; 0.2901)    (0.2275; 0.2501)   
2006  0.2887 11.48  0.2533 26.50 
  (0.2822; 0.2952)    (0.2454; 0.2612)   
Note:  95% confidence bands are given in parentheses. 
Source:  Own calculations based on SOEP, waves 1995-2006. 
These developments are referred to in support for the introduction of a minimum wage in the 
current German economic policy debate. As a remedy, proponents of this view, including the 
governing Social Democratic Party and the labor unions, have suggested a legal minimum 
wage of 7.50 € per hour. Although this suggested minimum is well below the union wages 
already declared legally binding for all employees in some industries
3, it is said to raise in-
                                                 
3   Contract wages set at the industry level can be declared generally binding by the government based on a 
special regulation contained in the so called ‘Entsendegesetz’ which was initially introduced in the construc-
tion industry in 1997 with the aim to prevent firms from other EU countries to compete at lower wages than 
the contract wage set by German employers and unions. Since then, this regulation has been extended to the 
cleaning and maintenance industry, the temporary work’s industry and most recently to the postal service in-
dustry. In these industries, minimum wages range from about 6.50 € per hour in the cleaning and mainte- 
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comes of employees in industries with low union coverage and a large share of low-wage 
jobs. However, this view neglects that low hourly individual wages need not translate into low 
household income due to the existing system of means-tested income support and the distribu-
tion of low wage earners among households. The German transfer system is characterized by 
a comparatively high ‘social minimum’ relative to net in-work income of low qualified people 
and benefit-withdrawal rates close to 100 %. It includes a basic rate for each family member, 
which depends on the age of children, and a maximum amount for housing costs also depend-
ing on family size. Since 2005, the social minimum defines the amount of means-tested un-
employment benefits (UB II) for people deemed ‘employable’ by the labor agency.
4  
This social minimum also defines the implicit minimum wage, i.e. the hourly wage 
which would yield the same net income in a full-time job as the means-tested UB II. As the 
illustrative calculations reported in Müller and Steiner (2009) show, this implicit minimum 
wage may well come close to or even exceed the current wage in the low-wage sector, it is 
especially high for one-earner couples with children and in East Germany. Furthermore, these 
illustrative calculations show that a minimum wage of 7.50 € per hour would not increase net 
household income for couples living in West Germany and would still not be sufficient to 
raise net household income for couples with both spouses working full-time in East Germany 
above the level of the means-tested unemployment benefit. Thus, the implicit minimum wage 
for families with children and one low-wage worker eligible for means-tested income support 
may be considerably higher than the suggested minimum of 7.50 € per hour.  
However, these illustrative calculations do not account for various important features of 
the German tax-benefit system. These include income taxation, especially the joint taxation of 
couples, other means-tested transfers, such as housing benefits, the exemption of ‘mini jobs’ 
from social security contributions, and unemployment benefit withdrawal rates below 100 %. 
Moreover, not all households are entitled to means-tested unemployment benefits, and not all 
couple households with children consist of only one earner. In the subsequent empirical 
analysis we will analyze the relationship between the minimum wage, the hourly wage and 
net household income on the basis of a microsimulation model which also takes employment 
effects of the minimum wage into account, as described in the next section.  
                                                                                                                                                          
nance industry in East Germany to almost 12 € in the West-German construction industry. A prerequisite for 
the applicability of this regulation is that any existing union wage contract covers at least 50 % of all regu-
larly employed people in the respective industry. 
4   ‘Employability’ is defined as the ability to work at least 3 hours a day and thus excludes persons with severe 
physical and mental disabilities only. People not fulfilling this criterion receive “social assistance” (‘Sozial-
geld’) which is also means tested and paid at similar amounts as UB II.  
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3  Empirical Methodology 
In order to simulate the effects of a shift in gross hourly wages induced by a federal minimum 
wage on net household income we employ a behavioral tax-benefit microsimulation model. 
Since the introduction of a minimum wage will also influence the allocation of labor, we in-
corporate potential employment effects into the model. This section sketches, first, our ap-
proach to calculate wage changes, second, the methods for the analysis of changes in labor 
demand and supply, and third, the simulation of income effects with and without behavioral 
adjustments of employment. 
3.1  Simulation of wage effects without behavioral adjustment 
In a first step, we abstract from behavioral adjustment and calculate minimum wage effects on 
the distribution of wages by substituting the suggested minimum wage of 7.50 € per hour for 
the hourly gross wage of employed people in our sample if a person’s observed wage falls 
short of the minimum. We rule out spill-over effects, i.e. wages higher than 7.50 € remain 
constant. For each employed person, the gross hourly wage is obtained by dividing reported 
gross earnings in the month before the interview by the number of hours worked in that 
month, where paid overtime hours are included.
5 Using SOEP sampling weights, we then 
compare the observed wage distribution (no minimum wage) and the hypothetical wage dis-
tribution conditional on the minimum wage under the assumption of no labor market adjust-
ment. 
We make use of wage data from the latest available wave of the German Socio-
Economic Panel Study (SOEP) collected in 2007. Since the great majority of respondents are 
interviewed in the first quarter of the year, we interpret these wage data to refer to the year 
2006. To simulate the wage distribution in 2008 we extrapolate wages two years in the future, 
where the main simulation assumes constant growth rates.
6 Another critical assumption con-
                                                 
5   This hourly wage measure may underestimate the effective hourly wage, for at least two reasons: First, since 
the majority of people in the SOEP is interviewed in the first three months of the year, fringe benefits are un-
derrepresented. Second, ‘paid hours’ may partly be paid for in later months, or may be compensated for by 
working less than normal hours in the future. 
6   To check the sensitivity of our simulation results with respect to this assumption, we have also used individ-
ual specific growth rates derived from the following dynamic wage growth regressions estimated on SOEP 
data for the years 1995-2007:  () ( ) ,- 1 ln ln , it i t it wt r e n d w v αβ γ Δ= + × + × Δ + where wit is the hourly gross 
wage of individual i in year t (t = 1997, 1998, …, 2007), α is a constant, trend is a linear time trend and 
,- 1   -. it it i t vu u = is a MA(1) error term. Since the error term is correlated with the lagged dependent variable, 
we estimated the equation with ln(wi,t-2) and trend as instrumental variables separately for men and women 
and for East and West Germany. IV estimates yielded statistically significant positive γ-coefficients and sig-
nificant negative β-coefficients for all groups, although both turned out relatively small in absolute terms. On 
the basis of the estimated wage growth equations expected growth rates for the years 2007 and 2008 were de- 
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cerns the question how to deal with very low hourly wages in the SOEP data. To account for 
measurement errors in the hours and wage data, we have excluded wages below 3 €/hour re-
ceived in regular employment. This equals roughly the 1 % percentile of the raw hourly wage 
distribution. We have included hourly wages below 3 €/hour, though, if they refer to supple-
mentary work of people drawing unemployment benefits (so-called “Aufstocker”). We pro-
vide sensitivity analyses of the scenarios where hourly wages below 3 € per hour remain in 
the analysis as measured or are set to the margin of 3 € per hour, respectively. We generally 
delete people in full-time vocational and apprenticeship training as well as disabled employ-
ees from the sample. “Secondary jobs“, i.e. jobs held in addition to the main job, are excluded 
in the base simulations. We present a sensitivity analysis with regard to the latter exclusion 
restriction below. 
3.2  Accounting for adjustment of labor supply, labor demand, and consumption 
As mentioned in the Introduction, there is an extensive literature on the economic effects of 
minimum wages which primarily focuses on their wage and employment effects. In their re-
cent survey of this literature Neumark and Wascher (2007) conclude that the majority of stud-
ies to date, which mainly refer to the US, have found no clear-cut evidence on the labor mar-
ket effects of minimum wages.
7 Most of these studies are descriptive and do not aim at for-
mally differentiating between labor supply and demand effects of the minimum wage, al-
though the interpretation of negative employment effects is usually in terms of the negative 
impact of the minimum wage on the demand for labor, whereas the studies finding positive 
employment effects tend to relate this to the increase in labor supply induced by a minimum 
wage. Accounting for both labor supply and demand effects in an ex-ante evaluation of the 
impact of the minimum wage on the distribution of incomes requires identifying these effects, 
which we try to do in the following on the basis of empirically estimated labor supply and 
demand elasticities. We also calculate indirect effects of the minimum wage on consumer 
prices and impute consumption rates at the household level to derive the consumption effects 
of the minimum wage on net household incomes. 
                                                                                                                                                          
rived recursively, with  2008 , 2007 ), ln | ln ( 1 , = Δ Δ = − τ r i ir ir w w E g . Using these estimated growth rates and the 
relation  ∏ = + =
2008
2007 2006 , 2008 , ) 1 (
r ir i i g w w , individual wages for 2008 are then derived for all persons for whom a 
wage was observed for 2006. For those individuals for whom growth rates could not be calculated due to 
sample attrition (at least three successive individual observations are required in the dynamic growth rate re-
gressions), mean values of growth rates within the estimation sample were imputed. 
7   For Germany, the empirical minimum wage study by König and Möller (2008) refers to the construction 
sector, where the contract wage was declared generally binding by the “Entsendegesetz” (see footnote 3). The 
authors find negative employment effects in parts of the East German construction sector but insignificant or 
even positive effects for West Germany.   
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Labor supply effects of the introduction of a federal minimum wage are estimated on the ba-
sis of a static discrete-choice labor supply model at the household level.
8 As suggested by van 
Soest (1995) the basis is a household utility model where utility is jointly maximized by the 
choice of different bundles of disposable income and leisure. Net household incomes for dif-
ferent categories of working hours and the scenarios with and without minimum wage are 
obtained from the tax-benefit calculator of the microsimulation model (see next sub-section). 
The specification as a conditional logit model and the assumptions of the approach are dis-
cussed in greater detail, e.g., in Haan and Steiner (2006). To sketch the main idea, the labor 
supply model is first estimated on the status quo data without a minimum wage. Then the pa-
rameters of the model are used to predict changes in participation and hours worked for the 
status quo and also for the scenario of a federal minimum of 7.5 € per hour (including the re-
sulting change in net household income). The difference between the predictions yields the 
labor supply effects of the minimum wage. For those households affected by the minimum 
wage who have higher incomes after its introduction the theoretically expected effect on labor 
supply is ambiguous, since income and substitution effects act in opposite directions. 
Labor demand effects are determined, first, by the wage changes induced by a federal mini-
mum (see last sub-section), and, second, by the wage elasticities of labor demand. Both ele-
ments vary for different groups on the labor market – by gender, qualification level or type of 
employment status (e.g. full-time contracts vs. marginal employment)
9 – and are influenced 
by institutional factors and the degree of substitutability between the different groups. With 
regard to demand elasticities direct and indirect effects have to be distinguished. For given 
wages, factors of production and demand for goods the direct effect for a specific labor mar-
ket group results from the substitution due to an increase in the cost of labor. Indirect effects 
follow from the substitution between different categories of labor which are all, but to a dif-
ferent degree, affected by the minimum wage. Moreover, the demand for labor is further re-
duced by a decreasing demand for goods as a result of higher production costs and prices.
10  
To account for these factors, we use empirical labor demand elasticities for different la-
bor market groups and distinguished by region and gender estimated by Freier and Steiner 
                                                 
8   The model is estimated separately for different household types: couple households where both spouses’ 
labor supply is assumed to be fix, couple households where one spouse’s labor supply is assumed to be fix, 
and male and female single households. 
9   For the simulation of labor demand effects we distinguish between skilled (secondary school or vocational 
education) and unskilled (neither secondary school nor vocational education) full-time workers, part-time 
workers and marginally employed. Those groups are divided by gender, yielding 8 different categories and 
are estimated separately for West and East Germany. Highly skilled workers (with university degree) are as-
sumed to be a quasi-fix factor in the short run. 
10   We do not consider adjustments of the capital stock. In the long run it is likely that low-skilled labor is sub-
stituted by capital.  
10
(2007). Given labor demand elasticities for L=8 groups, the change of the demand for labor of 
a specific group k (ΔBk) to a relative change in the hourly wage of this group (Δwk/wk) can be 
estimated by: 
k l l l kl l k B w w c B ∑ = Δ + = Δ
8
1 ) / )( ( η σ , 
where σkl is the (Hicks/Allen-) substitution elasticity, cl is the share of the wage costs of group 
l in total wage costs, and η is the price elasticity of demand for goods.
11 
Consumption effects are taken into account, first, by calculating changes of consumer prices 
for different types of goods. The price increases result from higher wages due to the federal 
minimum for different sectors. Wage increases depend on the number of workers affected by 
the minimum in the respective sector and are calculated as described above. We assume per-
fect competition and perfectly elastic supply of goods (increases in labor costs are thus fully 
borne by consumers) and relate wage increases in different sectors to price increases for dif-
ferent types of goods via input-output tables.
12 On the basis of the German income and con-
sumption survey (‘Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe’) we then estimate Engle curves 
for the consumption rate and shares of different consumption goods of the form: 
i zi z
z




1 ) log( , 
i zi z
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1 ) log( . 
where  Ci are consumption expenditures, Yi  available household income, xzi socio-
demographic characteristics, and Sgi consumption expenditures for good g in household i. We 
impute household-specific consumption rates on the basis of the right-hand side variables in 
the SOEP and calculate the effects of the federal minimum on consumption without and with 
adaption of the consumption rate following the increase in consumer prices.
13  
 
                                                 
11  Bachmann et al. (2008) follow a similar approach but define different labor market groups. They use a 
slightly different specification of the labor demand model as well as a different data base for the employment 
figures. Ragnitz and Thum (2008) and Knabe and Schöb (2008) use a simpler method assuming the labor 
demand elasticity to be the same for all groups (see Müller, 2009). 
12   Price increases for goods produced in sector n Δpn result from wage increases in the same sector Δwn (scaled 
by the share of wage costs in this sector wsn) and wage increases Δwm in all other sectors m where intermedi-
ary inputs for sector n are produced scaled by the share of wage costs in sectors m wsm and the share of in-
termediary inputs in sector n in relation to all inputs which is measured by the input coefficient amn : 
  ∑ Δ + Δ = Δ
m
m m mn n n n ws w a ws w p ) ( ) ( . 
13   Estimation results for the consumption rate are reported in Table A6 in the Appendix. Further information on 
measurement, the exact calculation of the burden and detailed results from the consumption share equations 
are available from the authors upon request.  
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3.3  Effects on the distribution of net household incomes 
To analyze minimum wage effects on the distribution of net household incomes we make use 
of the microsimulation model STSM which incorporates all major components of the German 
tax-benefit system. The STSM is based on the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) which 
is a representative sample of households living in Germany with detailed information on 
household incomes, working hours and household structure.
14 The tax-benefit calculator em-
bedded in the STSM allows us to compute net household incomes not only under the current 
wage structure but also for alternative wage structures, such as the one resulting from the in-
troduction of a minimum wage. Earnings from dependent employment is the most important 
income component for the great majority of households. The SOEP also contains information 
on earnings (and working hours) from a “secondary job”, i.e. a job held in addition to the 
main job, which we add to wage income for the calculation of net household income. Em-
ployees’ social security contributions and the income tax are deducted from gross household 
income and social transfers are added to get net household income. Social transfers include 
child allowances, child-rearing benefits, educational allowances for students and apprentices, 
unemployment compensation, the housing allowance, and social assistance. Taxable income 
is calculated by deducting certain expenses from gross household income. Analogous to the 
wage analysis we compare the net household incomes under the status quo and the hypotheti-
cal minimum wage scenario using SOEP sampling weights. 
First, we simulate the income effects as described without behavioral adjustments of la-
bor supply and demand (‘first round effects’). In a second step we explicitly take employment 
changes into account (‘second round effects’). Since labor supply effects are very small (see 
sub-section 4.2 below), we abstract from those behavioral labor supply adjustments and focus 
only on the labor demand effects. Based on the simulated labor demand changes (see last sub-
section) we calculate the share of people who become unemployed after the introduction of 
the minimum wage due to the demand side constraints for each group k of the labor market 
( k k B B / Δ ).
15 We then draw a weighted random sample of the same size among those who are 
affected by the minimum wage (i.e. earn wages below 7.50 € per hour) per group k with the 
weights being determined linearly by the distance between the earned wage and the minimum 
                                                 
14   STSM basically consists of two parts: a tax-benefit calculator that computes net household incomes for each 
sample household on the basis of information on gross incomes, and for different (hypothetical) legislations 
and different working hours of individuals, and an empirical labor supply model. A detailed description of 
STSM is contained in Steiner et al. (2008). For more information on the SOEP, see http://www.diw.de/soep. 
15   Depending on the assumed size of η  the demand change is positive for some i. Since we abstract from labor 
supply effects and in order to simplify the analysis we disregard positive employment changes in this version 
of the simulation. The only group where this simplification is relevant are women working part-time in West 
Germany.  
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wage. Those individuals selected in this manner become unemployed under the simulated 
minimum wage scenario. The procedure is repeated 50 times and average net household in-
comes are simulated as described above to get robust results. 
We will show that an increase in gross wages induced by a federal minimum leads to 
substitution effects between wage and transfer incomes. Therefore gains in net household in-
comes are likely to be smaller than the gross wage effects. On the other hand the state saves 
transfer expenses and reaches higher income tax revenues which could be re-distributed to 
households. We do not simulate these ‘third round’ effects here, since we do not want to 
speculate about a re-distribution mechanism. More importantly, those savings are reduced 
substantially, if labor demand adjustment is considered and unemployment increases. 
The data are taken from the current SOEP wave for the year 2007. Since the STSM is 
based on retrospective information on income components for the simulation of net household 
incomes for a given year, incomes computed on basis of the SOEP wave from 2007 refer to 
2006. Because our analysis is focused on the year 2008, we extrapolate incomes to that year 
on the basis of realized average growth rates for 2007 and expected growth rates for 2008.
16 
The tax-benefit system is also updated to include all known changes in regulations up to 2008.  
 
4  Results 
4.1  Effects on the wage distribution 
Table 2 summarizes the effects of the introduction of a minimum wage of 7.50 € per hour 
would have on the wages of already employed people in the absence of employment effects. 
The upper part of the table shows for Germany overall and for various subgroups the average 
gross hourly wage prevailing in 2008 and the average wage of currently employed people if 
the minimum was introduced.
17 The numbers in parentheses give, for each group, the absolute 
and relative differences in these two wage measures. We also report the median and the mean 
of these two wages.
18 On average, a minimum wage of 7.50 € per hour amounts to about 52 % 
                                                 
16   Since most interviews in the SOEP refer to the first quarter of the year, we have assumed that they will in-
crease with the annual growth rate in that year. Average annual growth rates are derived from the following 
indices for the years 2007 and 2008: 1.016, 1.016 for consumer prices; 1.020, 1.025 for wages; 1.003, 1.012 
for old-age pensions; 1.016, 1.016 for income from rents; and 1.04, 1.04 for income from profits (source: na-
tional accounts; BMWi, 2007; own calculations). We check the sensitivity of our simulation results to the as-
sumptions underlying the forecasting of wages below. 
17  Expected wages of currently not employed people would also be affected by the minimum wage and thus 
also potentially increase labor supply (see sub-section 4.2). 
18  As mentioned above wages below 3 €/hour earned in regular employment are excluded from the analysis. 
Wages below 3 €/hour are included if they refer to supplementary work of people drawing unemployment 
benefits (see also Section 2).  
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of the median and 47 % of the average gross hourly wage in the German economy.
19 For the 
median, this share varies between about 43 % for men in West Germany to about 63 % for 
women in East Germany.  
Table  2:  Wage distribution before and after the introduction of a legal minimum wage of 
7.50 € / hour, currently employed people only, 2008 
   Total Men  Women 
  Germany  West East West East 
  No MW  MW  No MW  MW  No MW  MW  No MW  MW  No MW  MW 
1
st-10
th  percentile  6.02 7.50 7.68 8.34 6.28 7.50 5.44 7.50 5.52 7.50 
  (1.48; 24.58)  (0.66; 8.59)  (1.22; 19.43)  (2.06; 37.87)  (1.98; 35.87) 
1
st-5
th percentile  5.09  7.50 6.26 7.56 5.73 7.50 4.60 7.50 4.57 7.50 
  (2.41; 47.35)  (1.30; 20.77)  (1.77; 30.89)  (2.90; 63.04)  (2.93; 64.11) 
6
th-10
th  percentile  6.98 7.50 9.12 9.12 6.89 7.50 6.27 7.50 6.47 7.50 
  (0.52; 7.45)  (0.00; 0.00)  (0.61; 8.85) (1.23;  19.62) (1.09;  17.00) 
11
th-15
th percentile  8.12  8.12  10.81 10.81  7.76 7.80 7.52 7.65 6.99 7.50 
  (0.00; 0.00)  (0.00; 0.00)  (0.04; 0.52)  (0.13; 1.73)  (0.51; 7.30) 
16
th-25
th percentile  9.62  9.62  12.47 12.47  8.87 8.87 8.67 8.67 7.68 7.73 
  (0.00; 0.00)  (0.00; 0.00)  (0.00; 0.00)  (0.00; 0.00)  (0.05; 0.65) 
Median  14.50 14.50 17.43 17.43 12.34 12.34 13.11 13.11 11.86 11.86 
  (0.00; 0.00)  (0.00; 0.00)  (0.00; 0.00)  (0.00; 0.00)  (0.00; 0.00) 
Mean  15.94 16.09 19.16 19.22 13.72 13.85 13.97 14.18 12.79 13.03 
  (0.15; 0.94)  (0.07; 0.37)  (0.12; 0.87)  (0.21; 1.50)  (0.23; 1.80) 
M W   a s   %   o f               
median    51.72   43.03   60.78   57.21   63.24 
mean    47.05   39.14   54.66   53.69   58.64 
People  affected  (%)            
overall    9.75   4.10   12.01   12.75   19.04 
within 1
st decile    97.56   41.06   100.00   100.00   100.00 
Δ wage bill  
(1000 € / month) 
455,626.62  107,237.17 49,536.90  224,820.86 74,031.70 
%  of  wage  sum  0.66 0.28 0.87 1.09 1.54 
Notes:  Only employed people aged 18-65 are included. Wage projections for 2008 are based on average 
growth rates. Percentiles are defined for the wage distribution without the minimum wage. Means are 
calculated within the range of given percentiles. Δ wage bill is the difference between the wage sum 
with and without the minimum wage, with wage sum = Σ (hourly wage×weekly working hours×4.2); 
employers’ social security contributions not included. 
The numbers in parentheses refer to absolute and relative differences in the two wage measures. 
Source:  Own calculations based on SOEP, wave 2007.  
As shown in the lower part of the table, in Germany overall almost 10 % of all employees 
would be affected by the minimum wage. Whilst among men in West Germany only about 
4 % of all employees would be affected, 12 % of males in East Germany and almost 13 % 
(19 %) of employed women in West (East) Germany earn wages below this minimum. Except 
                                                 
19   People in full-time vocational and apprenticeship training as well as „secondary jobs“, i.e. jobs held in addi-
tion to the main job, are excluded. With regard to the latter exclusion restriction see the discussion below.   
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for men in West Germany, all currently employed people in the bottom decile of the wage 
distribution would be affected by the minimum wage. Table A1 in the Appendix shows that 
the minimum wage would disproportionately affect younger employees, those with low quali-
fication, marginally employed people (i.e., those in “mini jobs”), employees in certain indus-
tries, in particular in agriculture and forestry, in the textile and food industry and in whole-
saled and retail trade, in private services, and those working in small firms.  
Overall, the introduction of the minimum wage would increase the total wage bill by 
more than 450 million € per month, or 5.5 billion € per year, which is about 0.7 % of the wage 
bill in 2008. In absolute terms, the lion’s share of this increase would go to female employees 
in West Germany, which reflects the still existing gender wage differential. The largest rela-
tive increase in the wage bill is estimated for women in East Germany (1.54 %), while the 
wage bill would only increase by about 0.3 % for men in West Germany. 
Despite this substantial increase in the wage bill, the minimum wage would have very 
little effect on average wages: Overall, the average hourly gross wage would increase by 15 
cent, or by less than 1 %. This direct wage effect varies between about 0.4 % for men in West 
Germany to about 1.8 % for women in East Germany. Table 2 also shows that for men in 
West Germany the modest wage increase would only occur in the bottom decile of the wage 
distribution, whereas wages would also slightly increase for the other groups with current 
wages just above the 10
th percentile. However, compared to the very pronounced increase in 
the first decile of the distribution, and in particular in the 1
st-5
th percentile, these changes seem 
negligible. For Germany overall, the minimum wage would raise the average hourly gross 
wage in the first decile by almost 25%, from 6.02 to 7.50 € per month per hour. Within the 
first decile, the wage increase varies between 8.6 % for men in West Germany to almost 38 % 
for women in West Germany. Within the 1
st-5
th percentile of wage distribution, the average 
wage increase amounts to about 47 %, ranging from about 21 % for men in West Germany to 
about 64 % for women in East Germany. 
Table A1 in the Appendix documents that these wage changes differ surprisingly little 
by age and qualification, but significantly by employment status. Low-pay of people in ‘mar-
ginal employment’, i.e. in jobs earning less than 400 € per month and not covered by social 
security, has been one alleged reason for introducing a minimum wage. As shown in Ta-
ble A1 hourly gross wages of people holding such jobs would be raised by more than 30 %, 
on average, compared to about 15 % for full-time employed people. Part-time employed indi-
viduals in the bottom decile of the wage distribution would receive a relative wage raise of 
about 30 % as a result of the federal minimum similar to marginally employed people. Corre-
sponding to the well-known firm-size wage differentials, minimum wage effects are declining  
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in firm size, with the share of affected individuals declining from more than 21 % in firms 
with less than 5 employees to less than 5 % in large firms. 
In view of the recent development of wage inequality documented in Section 2 (see 
Figure 1) forecasting wages to 2008 on the basis of common growth rates may be questioned. 
To check the sensitivity of simulation results to this assumption, we have forecasted wages on 
the basis of individual specific growth rates derived from dynamic wage growth regressions 
estimated on SOEP data for the years 1995-2007. Although the correlation between wages 
updated this way and on the basis of the common growth rates (see footnote 6, Section 3.1) is 
surprisingly high (correlation coefficient of 0.99), the level of individually predicted wages is 
slightly below that obtained by updating wages by common growth rates, especially in the 
bottom decile of the wage distribution. The overall wage bill would increase by more than 
0.8 % instead of only less then 0.7 % (compare Table 2 and Table A2 in the Appendix). Still, 
the effects of the minimum wage on the 2008 wage distribution are very similar if wages were 
updated on the basis of individual instead of common growth rates. Since estimated individual 
growth rates are derived from a period with an extraordinary decline in wages at the bottom of 
the distribution (see Figure 1), our wage growth regressions somewhat underestimate the rela-
tively high wage gains realized between 2006 and 2008. The use of average growth rates 
seems therefore more appropriate from an empirical standpoint.  
Another sensitivity check concerns the treatment of “secondary jobs”. Since the 2003 
“Mini Jobs” reform, jobs with earnings below 400 € per month have also been exempted from 
employees’ social security contributions if held in addition to a main job (see, e.g., Steiner 
and Wrohlich, 2005). Our calculations of the wage effects of the introduction of a legal mini-
mum wage do not include secondary jobs. Although it is currently not clear how they would 
be treated if a legal minimum wage was actually implemented in Germany, it seems rather 
difficult, both legally and politically, to exclude secondary jobs. Since the SOEP contains 
information on both earnings and hours worked in secondary jobs, we can include them in our 
analysis of the wage effects of the introduction of a minimum wage. Estimation results for 
this alternative simulation, which are summarized in Table A3 in the Appendix, show that the 
results deviate, albeit moderately (about 0.5 €/hour), within the first decile of the wage distri-
bution. Since only a limited number of people is affected by potential changes of secondary 
incomes, the overall findings change only marginally and do not affect any of our conclu-
sions. 
Given that our simulation results seem quite robust with respect to the way we forecast 
wages and the inclusion of secondary jobs, we continue our analysis of how wage increases 
affect net household incomes on the basis of the simulation results in Table 2.  
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4.2  Employment effects  
Labor supply effects 
Table A4 in the Appendix shows the predicted effects of the introduction of the minimum 
wage on labor supply, regarding both labor force participation and total hours worked in rela-
tive and absolute terms. Detailed estimation results for the conditional logit models are pre-
sented in Table A5 in the Appendix. Crucial model assumptions, in particular positive first 
derivatives of the household utility index with respect to income, are satisfied. 
As shown by Table A4, labor supply effects are very small. The total increase in labor 
force participation amounts to about 16,000 persons, the increase in total hours worked equals 
about 66,000 full-time equivalents. The main explanation for the small effects is the fact that 
the previously described wage changes correspond to relatively small increases of net house-
hold income (see discussion in sub-section 4.3) on which the labor supply decision is based. 
For couples labor supply effects are stronger for women compared to men both with respect 
to participation and hours choices whereas for singles the opposite is true. Overall households 
in the East show slightly larger labor supply responses compared to West Germany. Since the 
overall effects are fairly small, we will not consider labor supply changes in the simulation of 
household incomes with behavioral adjustment in this paper. 
Labor demand effects 
Table 3 summarizes compensated own and cross wage elasticities of the demand for labor 
(number of workers) for various labor market groups estimated in recent work by Freier and 
Steiner (2007). These elasticities are conditional on the level of output and the capital stock 
and were estimated separately for West and East Germany. They reveal a rather complex pat-
tern of substitution and complementarity among labor inputs. For instance, marginally em-
ployed women in West Germany and women working part-time are substitutes in production 
whereas marginally employed women and skilled women with full-time jobs are comple-
ments. For given demand for goods a relatively high increase in wages for marginally em-
ployed women induced by the minimum wage will lead to a decrease in labor demand for this 
group and also for skilled women in full-time, but an increase in labor demand for women 
working part-time. The elasticities for East Germany follow a similar pattern for this example. 
Note that highly skilled individuals were assumed to be quasi-fixed in the labor demand esti-
mations of Freier and Steiner (2007) which is why we do not calculate labor demand effects 
for this group. 
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Table 3:  Compensated own and cross wage elasticities (number of workers) 
West Germany  FT, U, M  FT, S, M  PT, M  ME, M  FT, U, W  FT, S, W  PT, W  ME, W 
FT, U, M  - -0 0. .5 51 10 0    0.419 0.003  -0.001 0.050 0.034  -0.048 0.055 
FT, S, M  0.085  - -0 0. .2 20 00 0    0.001 0.004 0.032 0.062 0.002 0.017 
PT, M  0.023  -0.001  - -0 0. .0 07 70 0    -0.110 0.031  -0.268 0.204 0.186 
ME, M  -0.019  0.316  -0.246  - -0 0. .1 13 30 0    -0.093 0.187 0.148  -0.162 
FT, U, W  0.108  0.367  0.012  -0.013  - -0 0. .3 37 70 0    -0.055 -0.081  0.030 
FT,  S,  W  0.020  0.136 -0.014  0.005 -0.009 - -0 0. .1 16 60 0    0.071 -0.051 
PT,  W  -0.044 0.007 0.033 0.011  -0.044 0.196  -0.260  0.099 
ME,  W  0.255 0.495 0.144  -0.058 0.056  -0.805 0.483  -0.570 
East Germany  FT, U, M  FT, S, M  PT, M  ME, M  FT, U, W  FT, S, W  PT, W  ME, W 
FT, U, M  -0.300  -0.086 -0.076  0.028 -0.036  0.487 -0.008 -0.008 
FT, S, M  -0.002  -0.110  -0.008 0.005 0.006 0.091 0.015 0.005 
PT, M  -0.135  -0.235  -0.290  0.006 0.114 0.235 0.302  -0.002 
ME,  M  0.172 0.476 0.019  -0.300  0.152 -0.778  0.332 -0.073 
FT, U, W  -0.060  0.099  0.116  0.041  -0.250  -0.273 0.237 0.091 
FT,  S,  W  0.044 0.128 0.012  -0.011  -0.014  -0.230  0.076 -0.010 
PT,  W  -0.010 0.063 0.055 0.018 0.040 0.245  -0.440  0.032 
ME,  W    -0.038 0.323  -0.008  -0.053 0.248  -0.582 0.437  -0.330 
Notes:   FT, U, M – Full-time unskilled men; FT, S, M – Full-time skilled men; PT, M – Part-time men; 
ME, M – Marginally employed men; FT, U, W – Full-time unskilled women; FT, S, W – Full-time 
skilled women; PT, W – Part-time women; ME, W – Marginally employed women.  
Numbers in italics are own-wage elasticities. 
Source:  Freier and Steiner (2007).  
Another important factor for the changes in labor demand is the wage change per group in-
duced by the minimum wage. In the first part of Table 4 the wage effects are broken down to 
the labor market groups used for the labor demand simulations. As mentioned above margin-
ally employed workers are most strongly affected by the introduction of the minimum wage, 
followed by part-time employed and unskilled workers. The highest relative wage increase 
occurs for marginally employed workers with 13 % (8 %) for women in the East (West), and 
about 5% for men. Other notable wage changes affect part-time employed and unskilled 
women working full-time in East Germany. 
In the second part of Table 4 the employment effects are documented which were calcu-
lated on the basis of the elasticities shown in Table 3, the wage changes per group, and 3 dif-
ferent price elasticities for the demand for goods (0, -1, -2). The overall employment effects 
depend on the assumed price elasticity of demand. If the demand for goods was perfectly ine-
lastic, labor demand would decrease only by about 57,000 persons. In this scenario the loss of 
marginal employment would partially be compensated by an increase in demand especially 
for part-time employed women. If the demand for goods was highly elastic with respect to 
price changes (assumed elasticity of -2), the overall decrease in demand for labor would 
amount to 384,000 persons. Again the lion’s share of employment losses concerns marginal  
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employment. In this scenario the demand for skilled full-time labor would shrink considera-
bly. We use the middle scenario with an assumed price elasticity of demand for goods of -1 
and a resulting decrease of labor demand of about 220,000 persons for the simulation of 
household incomes that includes the behavioral adjustment of labor demand in the next sub-
section.
20 
Table 4:  Changes in wages and labor demand (heads) 
    Wage Effects  Employment Effects 
      Affected No MW MW  Output price elasticities 
West Germany  (%) (€/hour) (Δ€) (Δ%)  0 -1 -2 
Women  5.98  14.85 0.06  0.41 -13,433 -32,772 -52,110
Skilled 
Men  2.19  17.79 0.03  0.19  14,874 -24,316 -63,505
Women  12.12  11.33 0.10  0.90  -907 -4,097 -7,286
Full-time 
Unskilled 
Men  4.19  16.36 0.04  0.27  4,010 -1,521 -7,053
Women  9.14  14.14 0.17  1.22  31,887 5,557  -20,773
Part-time 
Men  13.32  14.56 0.30  2.06  5,132 2,198  -735
Women  40.59  8.99 0.74  8.27 -81,463 -91,880  -102,297
Marginally employed 
Men  36.35  10.48 0.58  5.56 -10,024 -12,362 -14,699
Total         -49,924 -159,191 -268,459
East Germany            
Women  20.19  11.53 0.17  1.45  -1,684 -13,689 -25,694
Skilled 
Men  11.56  13.20 0.10  0.78  2,517 -19,717 -41,952
Women  39.48  11.37 0.23  2.01  787 31  -725
Full-time 
Unskilled 
Men  18.68  11.05 0.12  1.12  -6 -1,838 -3,670
Women  19.24  12.11 0.27  2.21  1,468 -9,230  -19,927
Part-time 
Men  24.62  11.22 0.36  3.25  -64 -2,336 -4,607
Women  51.53  7.68 1.00  13.05  -7,810 -10,607 -13,403
Marginally employed 
Men  23.47  9.01 0.44  4.87  -2,305 -3,960 -5,616
Total        -7,098 -61,346  -115,594
Notes:   Own- and cross-wage elasticities taken into account. Demand changes in numbers of employees 
(‘heads’).  
Qualification categories according to Freier and Steiner (2007): ‘skilled’ = secondary-school education 
or vocational training, ‘unskilled’ = neither secondary-school education nor vocational training. 
Source:  Own calculations based on elasticity estimates taken from Freier and Steiner (2007), SOEP wave 2007. 
 
                                                 
20   Our estimated employment effects are much smaller than those obtained by Bachmann et al. (2008), Ragnitz 
and Thum (2008) and Knabe and Schöb (2008). Bachmann et al. assume a rather small price elasticity of 
demand of -0.2 value and use different compensated labor demand elasticities which imply that most labor 
categories are gross complements. However, the main reason for differences in simulated employment effects 
seem to be that Bachmann et al. base their simulations on much larger relative wage changes induced by a 
minimum wage than we find in our study. One reason for this might be that their study is based on wage data 
from 2001, another reason might be that they include very low wages, e.g. of apprentices. Ragnitz and Thum 
use the same data set and assume a uniform labor demand elasticity of -0.7, which is also assumed in the 
study by Knabe and Schöb who use SOEP data instead.   
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4.3  Effects on the income distribution and inequality 
To which extent are the substantial increases in hourly wages we observe at the bottom of the 
wage distribution translated into higher net household incomes and changes in the income 
distribution? This question is answered by Table 5 which summarizes, for various types of 
households affected by a legal minimum, income changes which would be induced by the 
minimum wage. The second column of the table shows that, whilst the overall share of 
households affected by the minimum wage in Germany is 9.2 %, it amounts to 13.6 % in East 
and 8.25 % in West Germany. In the total population the share is above average for families 
with children, if both spouses work, and also for singles with children.  
Table 5:  Minimum wage effects on net incomes of households affected by the minimum wage, 
2008 
  MW of 7.50 €/hour 
  Δ Avg. income   Δ Total income 
 
Inci-









  %  € / month  € / 
month  %  € / 
month  %  Mio. €/ 
month  %  Mio. €/ 
month  % 
West Germany  8.25  2,655.88  47.40  1.78  24.29  0.91 87.0  70.68 45.0  60.35 
East  Germany  13.63  2,172.43  53.28  2.45  43.24  1.99 36.1  29.32 29.6  39.65 
Germany, overall  9.23 2,525.54  48.99  1.94  29.40  1.16  123.1  100.00  74.6  100.00 
Without  children  6.26  1,641.61  66.98  4.08  44.34  2.70 69.1  56.15 46.2  61.93 
With  children  13.8  3,141.43  36.45  1.16  18.99  0.60 54.0  43.85 28.4  38.07 
Germany, couples  12.17  3,022.23  45.73  1.51  22.90  0.76 80.9  65.69 40.9  54.81 
Without  children  8.26  2,200.11  67.45  3.07  34.86  1.58 32.8  26.66 17.1  22.96 
With  children  14.84  3,334.39  37.48  1.12  18.36  0.55 48.1  39.02 23.8  31.85 
Both  spouses  work 15.24  3,324.86  54.51  1.64  29.29  0.88 71.2  57.83 38.7  51.79 
One  spouse  works 7.61  2,384.23  17.37  0.73  2.13  0.09 4.3  3.46 0.5  0.71 
Germany, singles  5.87  1,346.29  56.72  4.21  44.83  3.33 42.3  34.31 33.7  45.19 
Without  children  5.14  1,143.22  66.56  5.82  52.80  4.62 36.3  29.49 29.1  38.97 
With  children  9.52  1,901.49  29.80  1.57 23.03  1.21 5.9  4.83 4.6  6.22 
Notes:  Incidence = Households affected by the minimum wage as percentage of all households in each group. 
Percentage changes of average income refer to households within the respective group, percentage 
changes of total income are calculated relative to the whole population. Employment status refers to the 
situation before the introduction of a minimum wage. When accounting for employment effects of a 
minimum wage a fraction of the employed is simulated to become unemployed according to demand 
side constraints of Table 4. Wage projections for 2008 are based on average growth rates. 
Source:  Own calculations based on SOEP, wave 2007. 
As documented in Table A7 in the Appendix, these differences by type of household can also 
be observed within the two regions, although they are more pronounced in West Germany. 
The minimum wage would increase net monthly incomes for those households affected by the 
minimum wage by about 49 €, on average, in Germany (see Table 5). The increase in income 
amounts to about 47 € in West and 53 € in East Germany. Relative to the current situation, net  
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household income would increase by about 1.8 % in West Germany and 2.5 % in East Ger-
many. Compared to the very large wage increases at the bottom of the wage distribution 
documented in the previous section, income changes are rather small and reflect the weak link 
between (hourly) wages and net household incomes. Since means-tested transfers are related 
to the presence of children in the household and to the employment status of the spouse, the 
minimum wage would lead to smaller increases of the monthly household income for families 
with children and couples with only one employed spouse. As Table A7 shows, this pattern is 
again somewhat more pronounced in West Germany, but can also be observed in the East. 
Table 5 also documents how the total income change induced by the introduction of the 
minimum wage would be distributed across households. Abstracting from employment ef-
fects, the income change would amount to about 123  million  € per month, or roughly 
1.5 billion € per year in total, which equals only about 27 % of the total increase in the wage 
bill (see Table 2). In this simulation without labor demand and supply responses, the rela-
tively small increase in net incomes reflects the “mechanical” substitution effect between 
wages and means-tested income support. The relatively large wage increases induced by the 
minimum wage at the bottom of the wage distribution thus mainly lead to the withdrawal of 
social transfers, higher income taxes, and increased public savings with relatively little impact 
on net household incomes. We do not consider fiscal effects here, but simulate the effects of 
an increase in wage costs through behavioral adjustments of labor demand and consumption. 
Potential public savings are diminished by lower output levels and higher unemployment. 
The following two columns of Table 5 reveal that about 30 % of the total increase in net 
household income would go to East Germany, where about 20 % of the total population lives. 
Only about one third (37%) of the income gain would go to single-earner households includ-
ing single parents. Families with children would receive about 45 % of the income gain. Al-
though households with children are more often affected by the minimum wage, the average 
and total income gain for them is lower, except for the total income change of couples. Thus, 
if one of the aims of a legal minimum wage is to increase the disposable income of families 
with children, it does not seem to be an effective policy instrument from this perspective. 
The corresponding results for the simulation accounting for the employment effects are 
reported in the last two columns of Table 5. The average monthly income gain for households 
affected by the minimum wage diminishes from 49 € to 29 € cutting the total increase in 
household incomes to about 74 million € per month. Therefore employment losses due to the 
legal minimum further reduce the moderate increases in household income substantially. 
Since the labor demand constraints are not distributed equally over household types the gains 
for families with children, for couple households, especially with only one spouse working,  
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are diminished disproportionately. Demand side constraints reduce income gains in West 
Germany more than in East Germany (see also Table A8 compared to A7 in the Appendix). 
In Table 6 the results for the scenarios with labor demand restrictions are presented that 
furthermore take consumption effects into account. If only the prices of consumption goods 
increased due to the minimum wage and households did not adapt their consumption behav-
ior, the effects on net incomes would become negative except for single households with chil-
dren. Households affected by the federal minimum wage would on average suffer an income 
loss of 14.50 € which would in total amount to 37 million € per month. As soon as the esti-
mated adjustment of the consumption behavior (induced by higher prices of consumption 
goods and an increase in available household income) is also considered, the effect on net 
household income becomes positive again because consumption is scaled back by the house-
holds. Yet, the average increase in household income (about 0.7 %) is substantially reduced 
by about one-third compared to the simulation with employment effects (about 1.2 %) in Ta-
ble 5. The consumption effects are not distributed equally over household types as they de-
pend on the consumption rate and structure which are different for the household types. 
Table 6:  Minimum wage effects on net incomes of households affected by the minimum wage, 
taking into account employment and consumption effects, 2008 
  MW of 7.50 €/hour 
  Δ Avg. income   Δ Total income 
 
Inci-
dence  No MW 
Price effects  Adaption of 
consumption  Price effects  Adaption of 
consumption 
  %  € / month  € / 
month  %  € / 
month  %  Mio. €/ 
month  %  Mio. €/ 
month  % 
West Germany  8.25 2,655.88  -16.67 -0.63 15.00  0.56 -30.9 83.62  27.8 63.90 
East  Germany  13.63 2,172.43 -8.84 -0.41 22.97  1.06  -6.1 16.38  15.7 36.10 
Germany, overall  9.23 2,525.54  -14.56 -0.58 17.15  0.68 -37.0  100.00  43.5  100.00 
Without  children  6.26 1,641.61 -9.64 -0.59 19.84  1.21 -10.1 27.19  20.7 47.50 
With  children  13.8 3,141.43  -17.98 -0.57 15.28  0.49 -26.9 72.81  22.9 52.50 
Germany, couples  12.17 3,022.23  -22.26 -0.74 13.16  0.44 -39.8  107.57  23.5 53.98 
Without  children  8.26  2,200.11  -18.73 -0.85 12.14  0.55  -9.2 24.92  6.0 13.71 
With  children  14.84 3,334.39  -23.59 -0.71 13.54  0.41 -30.5 82.65  17.5 40.27 
Both  spouses  work 15.24 3,324.86  -23.39 -0.70 15.89  0.48 -30.9 83.49  21.0 48.14 
One spouse works  7.61  2,384.23  -20.59  -0.86  4.14  0.17  -5.1  13.80  1.0  2.36 
Germany, singles  5.87  1,346.29 3.72 0.28  26.63 1.98  2.8  -7.57 20.0  46.02 
Without  children  5.14 1,143.22 -1.52 -0.13 26.71  2.34  -0.8  2.27  14.7 33.79 
With  children  9.52  1,901.49  18.06 0.95  26.44 1.39  3.6  -9.84  5.3  12.23 
Notes:  Incidence = Households affected by the minimum wage as percentage of all households in each group. 
Percentage changes of average income refer to households within the respective group, percentage 
changes of total income are calculated relative to the whole population. Employment status refers to the 
situation before the introduction of a minimum wage. Accounting for employment effects of a mini-
mum wage means that a fraction of the employed is simulated to become unemployed according to de-
mand side constraints of Table 4. Wage projections for 2008 are based on average growth rates. 
Source:  Own calculations based on SOEP, wave 2007.  
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Another relevant policy issue is how the minimum wage would affect the distribution of in-
comes. Table 7 answers this question regarding the distribution of net equivalent incomes of 
households affected by the minimum wage, by deciles, calculated for the 2008 wage structure. 
For Germany overall, the share of persons affected by the minimum wage in the bottom decile 
of the net equivalent income distribution is less than 6 %, and thus substantially smaller than 
the shares affected in each of the 2
nd-6
th deciles. Only in the higher deciles of the distribution 
does this share decline below the level it obtains in the bottom decile. As the regional break-
down in Table A9 in the Appendix reveals, the distribution of people affected by the mini-
mum wage across deciles of the net equivalence income distribution differs between the two 
regions. Whereas the share of people affected by the minimum is low in the first and second 
decile and highest between the 3
rd and 7
th decile in East Germany, this share is highest in the 
2
nd decile and declines after that in West Germany.  
Table 7:  Effects of a minimum wage of 7.50 € / hour on net equivalent incomes of households 
affected (€ per month) and on inequality measures, Germany 2008 
MW of 7.50 € / hour   
Δ Average equivalent income 
Decile  Incidence No  MW  Without employment effects  With employment effects 
  %  € / month  € / month  %  € / month  % 
1
st 5.65  690.01  23.77  3.44  17.61 2.55 
2
nd 17.4  874.25  37.18  4.25  20.74 2.37 
3
rd 19.08  1,071.10  30.10  2.81  24.77 2.31 
4
th 13.95  1,313.68  26.15  1.99  5.92 0.45 
5
th 12.43  1,495.85  40.46  2.70  29.26 1.96 
6
th 8.03  1,701.13  35.29  2.07  26.59 1.56 
7
th 5.63  1,874.88  21.84  1.16  14.83 0.79 
8
th 4.85  2,151.19  61.70  2.87  35.41 1.65 
9
th 4.56  2,662.17  37.72  1.42  29.61 1.11 
10
th 0.71  4,350.25  -3.01  -0.07  -6.91 -0.16 
Total 9.23  1,368.93  33.58  2.45  21.44 1.57 
Ineq. measures × 100  No MW  MW  Δ  Δ %  Δ  Δ % 
Gini coefficient  28.44  28.36  -0.078 -0.27 -0.046 -0.16 
  (27.46; 29.43)  (27.38; 29.35)      
MLD 14.02  13.95  -0.063  -0.45  -0.022  -0.15 
  (12.95; 15.08)  (12.89; 15.02)        
Atkinson (ε = 2)  27.85 27.79  -0.063  -0.23  0.062  0.22 
  (25.40; 30.30)  (25.33; 30.24)        
Notes:  Deciles for the overall equivalent net income distribution are calculated for the wage structure in 2008 
(without minimum wage). Incidence = Persons affected by the minimum wage as percentage of all peo-
ple within a given decile of the net equivalence income distribution. Percentage changes of average in-
come refer to equivalent persons within the respective group measured in equivalence units. Wage pro-
jections for 2008 are based on average growth rates. 
  The Gini coefficient is sensitive to changes in the middle of the income distribution. MLD is the mean 
log deviation of equivalent income which is a “bottom-sensitive“ inequality measure. The Atkinson 
inequality measure is calculated for a high degree of inequality aversion (ε = 2). For the exact definition 
and properties of these inequality measures, see, e.g., Cowell (1995). 5%-confidence bands are given in 
parentheses. 
Source:  Own calculations based on SOEP, wave 2007.  
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However, the share of people affected at the bottom of the income distribution is rather small 
in both regions. Thus, the minimum wage does not seem to be particularly well targeted at the 
poor also from the perspective of the distribution of net equivalence income implicitly taking 
into account the composition of households of people whose gross wages might have in-
creased substantially. 
Abstracting from employment effects, net equivalent income would increase for house-
holds affected by the minimum wage by about 34 €, or 2.5 %, on average (see Table 7). The 
average increase would be slightly larger in East Germany, both in absolute and in relative 
terms (see Table A9 in the Appendix). The largest relative increase in average equivalent in-
come would occur in the 2
nd decile of the income distribution and amount to about 40 € per 
month, or almost 5 % of this group’s net equivalent income in 2008. The negative difference 
for the very small share of affected households in the top decile probably follows from the 
loss of the splitting advantage of joint taxation of couples in Germany as soon as the second 
earner’s income grows as a result of the minimum wage. In relative terms this negative effect 
is not substantial, though. 
To investigate the potential effect the introduction of a legal minimum wage would have 
on the overall income distribution, Table 7 also reports standard summary inequality meas-
ures. The Gini coefficient, which is sensitive to income changes in the middle of the distribu-
tion, does not record any significant change. Using the bottom-sensitive mean logarithmic 
deviation (MLD) measure shows a very small decline in income inequality, which is also re-
corded by the Atkinson measure assuming a relatively high value for the inequality aversion 
parameter, i.e. ε = 2. These very small reductions in income inequality are comparable in 
West and East Germany (see Table A9 in the Appendix). Thus, in neither region would the 
minimum wage have any noticeable effect on overall income inequality.  
The last two columns of Table 7 report the simulation results taking employment effects 
into account. Due to these effects the average net equivalent income gain declines by more 





th deciles are cut substantially. Moreover, the minimum wage becomes less effective 
with respect to the reduction of overall income inequality as the smaller differences for the 
inequality measures show compared to simulation results not accounting for negative em-
ployment of the minimum wage. The results for West and East Germany show that these ef-




th deciles are reduced significantly (see Tables A9 and A10 in the Appen-
dix). In East Germany the reduction of income gains is more evenly distributed but slightly 
higher in the upper deciles.  
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Table 8 presents the corresponding results for the simulations that also include con-
sumption effects. In the first scenario which only considers price effects without behavioral 
adjustment the effects on net household equivalent incomes are negative throughout the whole 
income distribution. Income losses are on average 7 € per individual and month. Moreover, 
the small redistributive effects of the minimum wage vanish completely. In fact the income 
distribution under a federal minimum becomes more uneven since negative income effects are 
more pronounced in the lower deciles. This is also shown by a slight increase in all inequality 
measures.  
Table 8:  Effects of a minimum wage of 7.50 € / hour on net equivalent incomes of households 
affected (€ per month) and on inequality measures, taking into account employment 
and consumption effects, Germany 2008 
MW of 7.50 € / hour   
Δ Average equivalent income 
Decile  Incidence No  MW  Price effects  Adaption of consumption 
  %  € / month  € / month  %  € / month  % 
1
st 5.65  690.01  -6.13  -0.89  8.02  1.16 
2
nd 17.4  874.25  -3.32  -0.38  15.46  1.77 
3
rd 19.08  1,071.10  -6.47  -0.60  11.47  1.07 
4
th 13.95  1,313.68  -8.89  -0.68  9.40  0.72 
5
th 12.43  1,495.85  -9.57  -0.64  12.71  0.85 
6
th 8.03  1,701.13  -11.72  -0.69  9.02  0.53 
7
th 5.63  1,874.88  -12.59  -0.67  8.73  0.47 
8
th 4.85  2,151.19  -11.70  -0.54  9.47  0.44 
9
th 4.56  2,662.17  9.32  0.35  25.90  0.97 
10
th 0.71  4,350.25  -24.10  -0.55  -2.59  -0.06 
Total 9.23  1,368.93  -7.10  -0.52  11.98  0.88 
Ineq. measures × 100  No MW  MW  Δ  Δ %  Δ  Δ % 
Gini coefficient  28.44  28.48 0.033  0.12  -0.027  -0.09 
  (27.46; 29.43)  (27.37; 29.58)        
MLD 14.02  14.05  0.035  0.25  -0.022  -0.16 
  (12.95; 15.08)  (12.92; 15.19)        
Atkinson (ε = 2)  27.85 27.92  0.073  0.26  -0.021  -0.08 
  (25.40; 30.30)  (25.50; 30.34)        
Notes:  Deciles for the overall equivalent net income distribution are calculated for the wage structure in 2008 
(without minimum wage). Incidence = Persons affected by the minimum wage as percentage of all peo-
ple within a given decile of the net equivalence income distribution. Percentage changes of average in-
come refer to equivalent persons within the respective group measured in equivalence units. Wage pro-
jections for 2008 are based on average growth rates. 
  The Gini coefficient is sensitive to changes in the middle of the income distribution. MLD is the mean 
log deviation of equivalent income which is a “bottom-sensitive“ inequality measure. The Atkinson 
inequality measure is calculated for a high degree of inequality aversion (ε = 2). For the exact definition 
and properties of these inequality measures, see, e.g., Cowell (1995). 5%-confidence bands are given in 
parentheses. 
Source:  Own calculations based on SOEP, wave 2007. 
When the adaption of consumers’ behavior is also considered, the effects become positive 
again, except for the top decile (which also had slightly negative net effects in the other simu-
lations, see Table 7). The income gains which equal 12 € per month on average are albeit 
smaller compared to the scenario without consumption effects (see Table 7). The redistribu- 
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tive effect of the minimum wage is also reduced in this simulation, because households in the 
lower income deciles have higher consumption rates and are disproportionately negatively 
affected by the indirect effects of the minimum wage on consumption. 
 
5  Summary and Conclusion 
Since the mid-1990s, wage inequality has been increasing significantly in Germany, mainly 
driven by a marked relative decline of hourly gross wages at the bottom of the wage distribu-
tion and an increasing share of the low-wage sector. Although the decline in relative wages 
was most pronounced in East Germany, on average, male employees in West Germany were 
also strongly affected by it. Furthermore, income inequality has been increasing in recent 
years, especially in East Germany. These developments have led to the proposed introduction 
of a general statutory minimum wage in the amount of 7.50 € in Germany, one of the few 
OECD countries where a legal minimum wage does currently not exist. One popular rationale 
for the introduction of this proposed legal minimum wage is to reduce income inequality and 
prevent poverty. However, as stressed by previous minimum wage studies, there might only 
be a weak link between low hourly wages and net household incomes which renders the 
minimum wage policy a rather ineffective tool to combat inequality. This may be of particular 
relevance for Germany, due to the existing means-tested income support system with a high 
social minimum relative to net in-work income and high benefit withdrawal rates. 
To account for this important relationship we have analyzed the distributional effects of 
the introduction of a nationwide minimum wage of 7.50 € per hour on the basis of a micro-
simulation model which accounts for the complex interactions between individual wages, the 
tax-benefit system and net household incomes. We also analyzed potential labor supply and 
demand effects of the minimum wage and integrated these results in the microsimulation 
model. Simulation results on the basis of individual-level data from the German Socio Eco-
nomic Panel (SOEP) show that the proposed minimum wage would have only a modest over-
all impact on average wages in the German economy, but would have very substantial effects 
on wages at the bottom of the hourly wage distribution. Overall, the incidence of the mini-
mum wage varies from about 4 % for men in West Germany to 19% for women in the East. 
Except for men in West Germany, all currently employed people in the bottom decile of the 
wage distribution would be affected by the minimum wage. It would disproportionately affect 
younger employees, those with low qualification, and marginally employed people. The aver-
age hourly gross wage would increase by about 25 % in the bottom decile of the wage distri-
bution, and by about 47 % in the 1
st-5
th percentile, where these wage effects would vary sub- 
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stantially by gender and region. Expected wage increases at the bottom of the wage distribu-
tions would differ surprisingly little by age and qualification, but do differ significantly be-
tween full-time, part-time and marginally employed people. 
The work incentives of the proposed minimum wage are rather limited. We estimated 
an increase in labor force participation equivalent to 16,000 workers and an increase in hours 
worked equal to 66,000 full-time equivalents. The labor demand effects depend on the as-
sumed wage and output price elasticities. In the discussed scenario with an assumed price 
elasticity of demand for goods equal to -1 we estimate the decrease in labor demand to be 
about 220,000 persons. Marginally employed people would bear most of the employment 
losses. 
In contrast to the substantial wage effects at the bottom of the wage distribution, the in-
troduction of a minimum wage in the proposed amount would have little impact on net 
household incomes: On average, the increase in monthly net income of households affected 
by the minimum wage would amount to about 47  € (1.8  %) in West Germany and 53  € 
(2.5 %) in East Germany, and would be even smaller for families with children and couples 
with one employed spouse. If labor demand effects are also considered, the income gains are 
reduced to about 24 € for the West and 43 € for the East. If, in addition, indirect effects on 
consumption are also taken into account the gains are reduced further to 15 € and 23 € per 
month for the West and East, respectively. These relatively small income changes reflect the 
weak link between (hourly) wages and net household income. In total, the income change 
induced by the proposed minimum wage would amount to roughly 1.5 billion € per year, 
which is only about 27 % of the total expected increase in gross earnings. This amount would 
diminish to 900 million € per year if the reduction in labor demand would be taken into ac-
count, and further to 520 million € per year if consumption effects are also considered. About 
30 % of the total increase in net household income would go to East Germany, where about 
20 % of the population lives. Families with children would receive less than half of the in-
come gain and only a relatively small share of the income gain would be received by single-
earner households. 
The minimum wage would also not be particularly well targeted at low income house-
holds: For Germany overall, the share of persons in the bottom decile of the distribution of net 
equivalent household income who are affected by the minimum wage is markedly below the 
respective shares in the middle of the distribution. However, the largest relative increase in 
average equivalent income would occur in the bottom deciles of the income distribution, with 
only small gains in higher deciles in both East and West Germany. Consequently the sug-
gested legal minimum would only have negligible effects on the overall income distribution,  
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as indicated by standard summary inequality measures. The redistributive effects are further 
diminished by the reduction in labor demand and consumption effects. 
The suggested minimum wage does not seem to be an effective policy instrument to re-
distribute income. To a large extent, these results can be related to the structure of the means-
tested income support existing in Germany with its relatively high social minimum and high 
benefit withdrawal rates. This also implies that the lion’s share of the costs of income support 
for households with people earning low wages would be shifted from the tax-benefit system 
to the costs employing these people. Moreover, low wage earners are not primarily concen-
trated in households at the bottom of the income distribution, which is why the minimum 
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Table A1: Mean hourly gross wage (in €) with and without a minimum wage of 7.50 € / hour, 
within first decile of the hourly wage distribution, 2008. 
  People affected (in %)  No MW  MW 
 Overall  1
st Decile  € / hour  € / hour  Δ€ %Δ 
Germany,  overall  9.75  97.56 6.02 7.50 1.48  24.58 
Region          
West  Germany  8.50  98.07 5.88 7.50 1.62  27.55 
East  Germany  15.57  96.29 6.39 7.50 1.11  17.37 
Gender           
Men    5.50  55.13 7.12 7.88 0.76  10.67 
Women  13.86  100.00 5.48 7.50 2.20  36.86 
Age           
18-25  years  24.12  97.63 6.15 7.50 1.35  21.95 
26-35  years  8.48  98.25 6.11 7.50 1.39  22.75 
36-45  years  9.44  98.52 5.87 7.50 1.63  27.77 
46-55  years  7.21  95.31 6.09 7.50 1.41  23.15 
56-65  years  7.99  97.48 5.94 7.50 1.56  26.26 
Qualification          
High  4.04  92.62 6.18 7.51 1.32  21.36 
Medium  10.07  98.25 5.98 7.50 1.52  25.42 
Low  17.73  97.19 6.11 7.50 1.39  22.75 
Employment status          
Employed  full-time  5.15  96.19 6.51 7.50 0.99  15.21 
Employed  part-time  11.18  97.56 5.76 7.50 1.74  30.21 
Marginally  employed  39.97  98.9 5.73 7.50 1.77  30.89 
Sector          
Agriculture,  forestry  22.34  100.00 6.29 7.50 1.21  19.24 
Mining,  energy  0.04  100.00 7.26 7.50 0.24  3.31 
Chemical., synthetics., wood, 
paper industry.  4.61  98.52 5.89 7.50 1.61  27.33 
Building  industry  7.97  94.79 6.17 7.50 1.33  21.56 
Iron, steal, and heavy industry  4.77  94.19  5.43  7.51  2.08  38.31 
Engineering, electric, precision 
engineering, light industry  2.25  96.93 6.09 7.50 1.41  23.15 
Textile, food industry  17.75 100.00  6.45  7.50 1.05  16.28 
Wholesale and retail trade  14.79  98.52  5.80  7.50  1.70  29.31 
Railways, postal service, trans-
portation  13.32  97.51 6.40 7.50 1.10  17.19 
Public  services  5.76  97.16 6.07 7.50 1.43  23.56 
Private  services  15.35  97.20 6.02 7.50 1.48  24.58 
Missing,  not  assignable  13.51  96.98 6.06 7.50 1.44  23.76 
Firm size          
<  5  employees  21.10  98.06 5.83 7.50 1.67  28.64 
5-10  employees  17.15  98.74 5.95 7.50 1.55  26.05 
20-100  employees  17.74  97.58 6.31 7.50 1.20  19.02 
100-200  employees  10.61  98.78 6.18 7.50 1.32  21.36 
200-2000  employees  7.79  93.98 6.22 7.50 1.28  20.58 
>  2000  employees  4.28  95.91 5.72 7.50 1.78  31.12 
Missing,  not  assignable  3.49  95.49 5.97 7.50 1.54  25.80 
Notes:   Wage data for 2007 are extrapolated to 2008 using average growth rates (see text), weighted using 
SOEP personal sample weights to obtain population means. Wage projections for 2008 are based on 
average growth rates. 
Source:  Own calculations based on SOEP, wave 2007.  
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Table  A2  Wage distribution before and after the introduction of a legal minimum wage of 
7.50 € / hour, 2008 – wage projections based on estimated individual growth rates 
  Total Men  Women 
  Germany  West East West East 
  No MW  MW  No MW  MW  No MW  MW  No MW  MW  No MW  MW 
1
st-10
th  percentile  5.66 7.50 7.24 8.04 6.02  7.5 5.08 7.50 5.22 7.50 
  (1.84; 32.51)  (0.80; 11.05)  (1.48; 24.58)  (2.42; 47.64)  (2.28; 43.68) 
1
st-5
th percentile  4.78  7.50 5.91 7.50 5.41 7.50 4.34 7.50 4.33 7.50 
  (2.72; 56.90)  (1.59; 26.90)  (2.09; 38.63)  (3.16; 72.81)  (3.17; 73.21) 
6
th-10
th  percentile  6.57 7.50 8.57 8.57 6.66 7.50 5.82 7.50 6.09 7.50 
  (0.93; 14.16)  (0.00; 0.00)  (0.84; 12.61)  (1.68; 28.87)  (1.41; 23.15) 
11
th-15
th  percentile  7.66 7.72 10.3 10.3 7.29 7.52 6.91 7.50 6.68 7.50 
  (0.06; 0.78)  (0.00; 0.00)  (0.23; 3.16)  (0.59; 8.54)  (0.82; 12.28) 
16
th-25
th  percentile  9.1  9.1 12.02 12.02 8.35 8.35 8.14 8.14 7.33 7.55 
  (0.00; 0.00)  (0.00; 0.00)  (0.00; 0.00)  (0.00; 0.00)  (0.22; 3.00) 
Median  14.21 14.21 16.89 16.89  12.1  12.1 12.74 12.74 11.85 11.85 
  (0.00; 0.00)  (0.00; 0.00)  (0.00; 0.00)  (0.00; 0.00)  (0.00; 0.00) 
Mean  15.75 15.94 18.89 18.97 13.65 13.82 13.76 14.03 12.85 13.15 
  (0.19; 1.21)  (0.08; 0.42)  (0.17; 1.25)  (0.27; 1.96)  (0.30; 2.33) 
M W   a s   %   o f               
Median    52.78   44.41   61.98   58.87   63.21 
Mean    47.62   39.70   54.95   54.51   58.37 
People  affected  (%)            
Overall    9.88   4.09   12.12   12.96   19.44 
Within 1
st decile    100.00   47.95   100.00   100.00   100.00 
Δ Wage bill  
(1000 € / month) 
494,319.90  112,301.24 56,878.44  245,261.23 79,878.99 
%  of  wage  sum  0.84 0.35 1.16 1.39 1.92 
Notes:  Individual growth rates are estimated from panel wage regressions as described in Section 3.1. 
Only employed people aged 18-65 are included. Percentiles are defined for the wage distribution with-
out the minimum wage. Means are calculated within the range of given percentiles.  
Δ wage bill is the difference between the wage sum with and without the  minimum wage,  
with wage sum = Σ (hourly wage×weekly working hours×4.2). The wage sum does not include em-
ployers’ social security contributions. 
The numbers in parentheses refer to absolute and relative differences in the two wage measures. 
Source:  Own calculations based on SOEP, wave 2007.  
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Table  A3  Wage distribution before and after the introduction of a legal minimum wage of 
7.50 € / hour, including “secondary jobs”, 2008 
  Total Men  Women 
  Germany  West East West East 
  No 
MW  MW  No 
MW  MW  No 
MW  MW  No 
MW  MW  No 
MW  MW 
1
st-10
th  percentile  5.45 7.50 6.72 7.84 5.72 7.50 4.97 7.50 4.86 7.50 
  (2.12; 39.41)  (1.12; 16.67)  (1.78; 31.12)  (2.53; 50.91)  (2.64; 54.32) 
1
st-5
th percentile  4.42  7.50 5.31 7.50 4.83 7.5  4.17 7.5 3.78  7.5 
  (3.08; 69.68)  (2.19; 41.24)  (2.67; 55.28)  (3.33; 79.86)  (3.72; 98.41) 
6
th-10
th  percentile  6.49 7.50 8.19  8.2 6.58  7.5 5.81  7.5 5.99  7.5 
  (1.01; 15.62)  (0.01; 0.12)  (0.92; 13.98)  (1.69; 29.09)  (1.51; 25.21) 
11
th-15
th  percentile  7.72 7.77 9.98 9.98 7.39 7.56 6.99  7.5 6.79  7.5 
  (0.05; 0.65)  (0.00; 0.00)  (0.17; 2.3)  (0.51; 7.30)  (0.71; 10.46) 
16
th-25
th percentile  9.15  9.15  11.91 11.91  8.51 8.51 8.30 8.30 7.54 7.64 
  (0.00; 0.00)  (0.00; 0.00)  (0.00; 0.00)  (0.00; 0.00)  (0.1; 1.33) 
Median  14.22 14.22 17.23 17.23 12.27 12.27 12.82 12.82 11.82 11.82 
  (0.00; 0.00)  (0.00; 0.00)  (0.00; 0.00)  (0.00; 0.00)  (0.00; 0.00) 
Mean  15.89 16.10 19.06 19.17 13.77 13.96 13.95 14.23 12.75 13.06 
  (0.21; 1.32)  (0.11; 0.58)  (0.19; 1.38)  (0.28; 2.01)  (0.31; 2.43) 
M W   a s   %   o f               
Median    52.74   43.53   61.13   58.50   63.45 
Mean    47.20   39.35   54.47   53.76   58.82 
People  affected  (%)            
Overall    11.66   5.74   13.71   15.04   20.6 
Within 1
st decile    100.00   57.45   100.00   100.00   100.00 
Δ Wage bill  
(1000 € / month) 
559,058.81  146,008.96 58,915.73  267,265.35 86,868.76 
%  of  wage  sum  0.80 0.38 1.03 1.27 1.78 
Notes:  Only employed people aged 18-65 are included. Percentiles are defined for the wage distribution with-
out the minimum wage. Wage projections for 2008 are based on average growth rates. Means are calcu-
lated within the range of given percentiles.  
Δ wage bill is the difference between the wage sum with and without the  minimum wage,  
with wage sum = Σ (hourly wage×weekly working hours×4.2). The wage sum does not include em-
ployers’ social security contributions.  
The numbers in parentheses refer to absolute and relative differences in the two wage measures. 
Source:  Own calculations based on SOEP, wave 2007.  
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Table A4: Labor supply effects of a legal minimum wage of 7.50 € / hour, 2008 
  West Germany  East Germany 
 Men  Women  Men  Women 
Change in labor force participation 
rate (in percentage points) 
    
Couple, both spouses flexible  0.03  0.04  0.08  0.10 
  (0.02; 0.04)  (0.02; 0.05)  (0.05; 0.11)  (0.05; 0.15) 
Couple, one spouse flexible  0.02  0.13  0.02  0.16 
  (0.00; 0.04)  (0.02; 0.23)  (0.00; 0.05)  (0.04; 0.28) 
Singles  0.11 0.08 0.24 0.17 
  (0.04; 0.19)  (0.02; 0.14)  (0.05; 0.42)  (0.07; 0.26) 
Change in average working hours  
(in percent)      
Couple, both spouses flexible  0.13  0.60  0.48  0.67 
  (0.07; 0.18)  (0.41; 0.79)  (0.29; 0.66)  (0.40; 0.94) 
Couple, one spouse flexible  0.06  0.45  0.09  0.57 
  (0.00; 0.12)  (0.04; 0.86)  (0.00; 0.18)  (0.13; 1.00) 
Singles  0.46 0.33 0.97 0.65 
  (0.14; 0.78)  (0.03; 0.63)  (0.18; 1.77)  (0.25; 1.05) 
Additional labor supply 
(in 1,000 persons)      
Couple, both spouses flexible  1.99  1.98  0.93  1.01 
  (1.24; 2.74)  (1.26; 2.71)  (0.56; 1.30)  (0.51; 1.51) 
Couple, one spouse flexible  0.14  1.52  0.04  0.45 
  (-0.03; 0.31)  (0.24; 2.80)  (-0.01; 0.09)  (0.12; 0.79) 
Singles  3.34 2.24 1.50 0.96 
  (1.10; 5.58)  (0.47; 4.02)  (0.33; 2.67)  (0.42; 1.51) 
Additional working hours 
(in 1,000 full-time equivalents)      
Couple, both spouses flexible  6.64  18.97  4.66  5.64 
  (3.27; 10.01)  (13.27; 24.67)  (2.91; 6.41)  (3.33; 7.95) 
Couple, one spouse flexible  0.45  3.36  0.16  1.19 
  (0.01; 0.89)  (0.67; 6.04)  (0.01; 0.32)  (0.37; 2.00) 
Singles  9.57 6.65 5.01 3.27 
  (3.65; 15.49)  (1.36; 11.94)  (1.26; 8.75)  (1.32; 5.23) 
Notes:  Bootstrapped confidence bands are given in parentheses. 
Source:  Own calculations based on STSM and SOEP, wave 2007. 
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Table A5: Conditional logit labor supply models 










  Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
Income    -1.439 5.347 5.021 4.410  -4.900 2.916  -1.437 4.178  -10.262 2.527 
Income  squared    0.820 0.315 0.318 0.176 0.666 0.151 0.428 0.147 0.670 0.073 
Income × husband’s leisure   -1.305  0.321  -2.056  0.632      -0.473  0.652     
Income × wife’s leisure   -0.538  0.288      -0.723  0.371      0.871  0.461 
Husband’s  leisure    61.922  6.547 46.937 10.459     20.669 10.434     
Husband’s leisure squared   -4.860  0.353  -3.523  0.897      -1.896  0.823     
Wife’s  leisure    34.469 6.023     2.675 6.714      -14.339 6.972 
Wife’s  leisure  squared    -1.704 0.344     0.604 0.680     1.622 0.615 
Husband’s  leisure  ×  wife’s  leisure    -2.360  0.923         
Husband’s leisure × dummy1   -4.176  4.024  -0.548  0.746      -0.915  0.733     
Wife’s leisure × dummy1   -3.999  3.713      -1.629  0.348      -1.415  0.505 
Husband’s leisure × wife’s leisure 
× dummy1   1.047  0.955         
Income  ×  dummy1    -1.432  4.524         
Income  squared  ×  dummy1  0.141  0.314         
Husband’s  leisure  ×  dummy2  -8.612 2.394 0.689 0.397     0.451 0.320     
Wife’s leisure × dummy2  -9.666  2.248      -0.335  0.661      -0.006  0.287 
Husband’s leisure × wife’s leisure 
× dummy2  1.822  0.590         
Income  ×  dummy2  4.014  1.407         
Income  squared  ×  dummy2  -0.368  0.113         
Husband’s leisure × husband’s age   -0.278  0.068  -0.238  0.109      -0.120  0.096     
Husband’s leisure squared × 
Husband’s age squared   0.421 0.075 0.323 0.125     0.243 0.111     
Wife’s leisure × wife’s age   -0.411  0.072      -0.121  0.115      -0.209  0.084 
Wife’s leisure squared × wife’s 
age squared   0.618 0.086     0.262 0.123     0.350 0.099 
Husband’s leisure × husband’s 
health status   2.106 0.540 1.415 1.003     0.980 0.756     
Wife’s leisure × wife’s health 
status   0.882 0.712     2.558 1.256     0.410 0.834 
Wife’s leisure × dummy 3  3.548  0.453      3.485  1.006      3.193  1.306 
Wife’s leisure × dummy 4  2.714  0.309      2.011  0.618      2.495  0.593 
Wife’s  leisure  ×  dummy  5  2.521  0.195         
Husband’s leisure × dummy 3     1.766  1.031    79.740  3091.5
92    
Husband’s leisure × dummy 4      -1.869  0.958      -1.307  1.109     
Number of observations  73,656  1,856  4,566  3,082  6,394 
Log Likelihood  -8,026.13  -510.75  -1,256.95  -853.33  -1,713.63 
LR chi² (28)  3,454.64  264.98  213.17  430.33  392.05 
Notes:   Dummy 1: Head of household (person answering the GSOEP household questionnaire) is German 
Dummy 2: Household is living in East Germany 
Dummy 3: Children under the age of 3 in household 
Dummy 4: Children between 3 and 6 in household 
Dummy 5: Children between 7 and 16 in household 
× indicates an interaction term 




Table A6: OLS-estimation of household’s consumption rate 
 West-Germany East-Germany
Variable  coeff.  s. e.  coeff.  s. e. 
Log(disposable income)  -0.270
*** 0.010  -0.335
*** 0.032 
Dummy1: single men without children
1 0.213
* 0.093  -0.211 0.299 
Dummy2: single with children  -0.643
*** 0.141  -0.137 0.330 
Dummy3: couple without children  -0.303
** 0.103  -0.124 0.282 
Dummy4: couple with more than 1 child  -0.079  0.109   0.106  0.307 
Dummy5: other households  -0.467
*** 0.123  -0.126 0.309 
Log(disposable income)*dummy1  -0.033
** 0.012  -0.055 0.031 
Log(disposable income)*dummy2  -0.021 0.017  -0.051 0.039 
Log(disposable income)*dummy3  -0.062
*** 0.011  -0.047 0.033 
Log(disposable income)*dummy4  -0.098
*** 0.014  -0.060 0.043 
Log(disposable income)*dummy5  -0.086




** 0.014  -0.044 0.037 
Donations & heritages  -0.000
*** 0.000  -0.000
*** 0.000 
Female household head    0.009 0.006  -0.011 0.009 
Dummy capital income  -0.035
*** 0.005  -0.040
*** 0.011 
Dummy car in household   0.097
*** 0.007    0.101
*** 0.013 
Dummy owned house  -0.019
*** 0.004    0.001 0.011 
Dummy owned apartment  -0.025
*** 0.006  -0.013 0.015 
Residential area in square meters   0.001
*** 0.000    0.001
*** 0.000 
Age of household head  -0.008  0.007   0.041
** 0.015 
Age squared   0.000  0.000  -0.001
* 0.000 
Age cubed  -0.000  0.000   0.000
* 0.000 
Household head working part-time
3   0.038
** 0.014  -0.006 0.037 
Household head marginally working   0.056  0.072  -0.131
* 0.056 
Household head working, no information   0.048  0.047   0.016  0.088 
Household head not working  -0.059
** 0.019    0.059 0.119 
Second person working full-time
4   0.859
*** 0.110    0.010 0.026 
Second person working part-time   0.872
*** 0.110    0.012 0.027 
Second person marginally working   0.867
*** 0.110  -0.042 0.039 
Second person working, no information   0.873
*** 0.111  (dropped)   
Second person not working   0.865
*** 0.110  -0.002 0.026 
Dummies for household head’s education
5      
University of applied science   0.005  0.005  -0.002  0.010 
Technical school  -0.009  0.005  -0.033
** 0.011 
Apprenticeship -0.013
** 0.005  -0.040
*** 0.011 
Other graduation  -0.028
* 0.011  -0.023 0.038 
In education, student  -0.011  0.017  -0.029  0.039 
No graduation  -0.034
** 0.013  -0.039 0.052 
Social position of household head
6      
White-collar worker  -0.020
*** 0.004  -0.016 0.014 
Blue-collar worker  -0.016
** 0.006  -0.034
* 0.016 
Unemployed   0.079
*** 0.020  -0.078 0.116 
Retired person   0.134
*** 0.023  -0.004 0.115 
Old-age pensioner   0.140
*** 0.024  (dropped)   
Constant   2.751
*** 0.112  3.115
*** 0.320 
R-squared 0.4247  0.4227 
Number of observations  25,687  6,813 
Notes: 
1 Base are single female households without children and couple with one child. 
2 Dummy6 stands for 
couple with one child. 
3 Base is household head working full-time. 
4 Base is no second person in house-
hold. 
5 Base is college. 
6 Base is public servant. 
  Other controls in the regression not shown in table: dummies for federal land, community size, family 
status, foreigners, main source of income in household, interaction terms for household head’s em-
ployment and second person’s employment 
 
* Significance at 5% level.  
** Significance at 1% level.  
*** Significance at 0.1% level. 
Source:  Own calculations based on SOEP, wave 2007.  
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Table A7: Effects on net household incomes for those households affected by a minimum wage 
of 7.50 € / hour, 2008 
  MW of 7.50 € / hour 
 
Households 
affected by MW  No MW 
Δ Average income  Δ Total income 
  %  € / month  €/ month  %  1000 € / month  % 
West Germany, overall  8.25  2,655.88  47.40  1.78  87,033.15  100.00 
Without children  5.00  1,651.86  70.51  4.27  46,921.59  53.91 
With children  13.1  3,226.66  34.27  1.06  40,111.56  46.09 
West Germany, couples  11.25  3,127.67  40.94  1.31  55,825.12  64.14 
Without children  7.15  2,227.50  60.41  2.71  20,942.89  24.06 
With children  13.98  3,434.57  34.30  1.00  34,882.24  40.08 
Both spouses work  14.47  3,412.98  46.29  1.36  47,636.16  54.73 
One spouse works  6.60  2,429.00  15.90  0.65  3,029.12  3.48 
West Germany, singles  4.66  1,294.20  66.06  5.10  31,208.03  35.86 
Without children  3.76  1,025.77  81.50  7.95  25,978.70  29.85 
With children  9.23  1,850.96  34.03  1.84  5,229.33  6.01 
East Germany, overall  13.63  2,172.43  53.28  2.45  36,106.13  100.00 
Without children  11.56  1,623.03  60.58  3.73  22,218.10  61.54 
With children  17.30  2,820.54  44.67  1.58  13,888.02  38.46 
East Germany, couples  16.79  2,667.38  61.85  2.32  25,060.24  69.41 
Without children  13.41  2,132.31  84.87  3.98  11,888.54  32.93 
With children  19.38  2,950.10  49.69  1.68  13,171.70  36.48 
Both spouses work  19.01  2,997.78  85.05  2.84  23,579.56  65.31 
One spouse works  16.33  2,228.56  22.49  1.01  1,232.51  3.41 
East Germany, singles  10.66  1,436.59  40.53  2.82  11,045.88  30.59 
Without children  10.65  1,308.38  45.56  3.48  10,329.56  28.61 
With children  10.68  2,070.98  15.63  0.75  716.32  1.98 
Notes:  Households affected by the minimum wage as percentage of all households in each group. Percentage 
changes of average income refer to households within the respective group, percentage changes of total 
income are calculated relative to the whole population. Income projections for 2008 are based on aver-
age growth rates. 
Source:  Own calculations based on SOEP, wave 2007. 
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Table A8: Effects on net household incomes for those households affected by a minimum wage 
of 7.50 € / hour, taking into account labor demand adjustment, 2008 
  MW of 7.50 € / hour 
 
Households 
affected by MW  No MW 
Δ Average income  Δ Total income 
  %  € / month  € / month  %  1000 € / month  % 
West Germany, overall  8.25  2,655.88  24.29  0.91  45,039.06  100.00 
Without children  5.00  1,651.86  41.78  2.53  28,083.84  62.35 
With children  13.1  3,226.66  14.34  0.44  16,955.22  37.65 
West Germany, couples  11.25  3,127.67  15.82  0.51  21,792.80  48.39 
Without children  7.15  2,227.50  25.59  1.15  8,959.43  19.89 
With children  13.98  3,434.57  12.50  0.36  12,833.37  28.49 
Both spouses work  14.47  3,412.98  19.00  0.56  19,744.60  43.84 
One spouse works  6.60  2,429.00  1.15  0.05  221.18  0.49 
West Germany, singles  4.66  1,294.20  48.72  3.76  23,246.26  51.61 
Without children  3.76  1,025.77  59.40  5.79  19,124.41  42.46 
With children  9.23  1,850.96  26.55  1.43  4,121.85  9.15 
East Germany, overall  13.63  2,172.43  43.24  1.99  29,595.89  100.00 
Without children  11.56  1,623.03  48.97  3.02  18,140.83  61.30 
With children  17.30  2,820.54  36.48  1.29  11,455.05  38.70 
East Germany, couples  16.79  2,667.38  46.7  1.75  19,112.89  64.58 
Without children  13.41  2,132.31  57.8  2.71  8,177.00  27.63 
With children  19.38  2,950.10  40.84  1.38  10,935.89  36.95 
Both spouses work  19.01  2,997.78  67.52  2.25  18,908.21  63.89 
One spouse works  16.33  2,228.56  5.53  0.25  305.97  1.03 
East Germany, singles  10.66  1,436.59  38.08  2.65  10,483.00  35.42 
Without children  10.65  1,308.38  43.51  3.33  9,963.84  33.67 
With children  10.68  2,070.98  11.22  0.54  519.16  1.75 
Notes:  Households affected by the minimum wage as percentage of all households in each group. Percentage 
changes of average income refer to households within the respective group, percentage changes of total 
income are calculated relative to the whole population in West and East respectively. Accounting for 
employment effects of a minimum wage means that a fraction of the employed is simulated to become 
unemployed according to demand side constraints of Table 4. Income projections for 2008 are based on 
average growth rates. 
Source:  Own calculations based on SOEP, wave 2007. 
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Table A9: Effects of a minimum wage of 7.50 € / hour on net equivalent incomes of households 
affected by minimum wage (€ per month) by region, 2008 
  MW of 7.50 € / hour 
 
Persons 
affected by MW 
No MW 
Δ average equivalent income 
Decile  %  € / month  € / month  % 
West  Germany       
1
st 7.98  720.73  23.48  3.26 
2
nd 18.62  914.98  38.03  4.16 
3
rd 14.53  1,152.72  27.85  2.42 
4
th 11.75  1,369.10  22.79  1.66 
5
th 9.53  1,555.03  50.17  3.23 
6
th 9.10  1,778.47  15.71  0.88 
7
th 3.76  2,027.00  67.61  3.34 
8
th 3.80  2,228.74  44.36  1.99 
9
th 2.58  2,789.23  17.65  0.63 
10
th 0.80  4,470.75  3.09  0.07 
Total 8.25  1,376.16  32.28  2.35 
Inequality measures × 100  No MW  MW  Δ absolute  Δ % 
Gini coefficient  28.23  28.16  -0.071  -0.25 
  (27.11; 29.35)  (27.04; 29.28)    
MLD 13.92  13.86  -0.059  -0.43 
  (12.73; 15.11)  (12.68; 15.04)     
Atkinson (ε = 2)  28.13 28.07  -0.063  -0.22 
  (25.24; 31.02)  (25.17; 30.97)     
  MW of 7.50 € / hour 
 
Persons 
affected by MW 
No MW 
Δ average equivalent income 
Decile  %  € / month  € / month  % 
East  Germany       
1
st 2.37  623.73  45.79  7.34 
2
nd 3.24  721.81  79.54  11.02 
3
rd 23.17  885.49  33.98  3.84 
4
th 33.17  1,045.49  27.11  2.59 
5
th 13.28  1,244.19  48.69  3.91 
6
th 20.04  1,397.72  29.32  2.10 
7
th 12.76  1,571.33  40.65  2.59 
8
th 13.29  1,764.64  44.62  2.53 
9
th 5.19  2,180.57  8.82  0.40 
10
th 9.63  2,645.64  63.66  2.41 
Total 13.63  1,349.34  37.12  2.75 
Inequality measures × 100  No MW  MW  Δ absolute  Δ % 
Gini coefficient  26.89  26.82  -0.070  -0.26 
  (25.47; 28.32)  (25.39; 28.25)    
MLD 12.15  12.10  -0.043  -0.35 
  (10.70; 13.59)  (10.65; 13.55)    
Atkinson (ε = 2)  23.75 23.74  -0.018  -0.08 
  (19.84; 27.67)  (19.80; 27.67)    
Notes:  Deciles for the overall equivalent net income distribution are calculated for the wage structure in 2008 
(without minimum wage) in the respective region. People affected refer to people within a given decile 
of this distribution affected by the minimum wage. % of Δ average income refers to average equivalent 
income in the respective decile and region. Accounting for employment effects of a minimum wage 
means that a fraction of the employed is simulated to become unemployed according to demand side 
constraints of Table 4. Income projections for 2008 are based on average growth rates.   
MLD is the mean log deviation of equivalent income. The Atkinson inequality measure is calculated for 
a high degree of inequality aversion (ε = 2). For the exact definition and properties of these inequality 
measures, see, e.g., Cowell (1995). 5%-confidence bands are given in parentheses. 
Source:  Own calculations based on SOEP, wave 2007.  
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Table A10: Effects of a minimum wage of 7.50 € / hour on net equivalent incomes of households 
affected by minimum wage (€ per month) by region, taking into account labor de-
mand adjustment, Inequality measures, 2008  
  MW of 7.50 € / hour 
 
Persons 
affected by MW 
No MW 
Δ Average equivalent income 
Decile  %  € / month  € / month  % 
West  Germany       
1
st 7.98  720.73  1.19  0.17 
2
nd 18.62  914.98  26.50  2.90 
3
rd 14.53  1,152.72  17.72  1.54 
4
th 11.75  1,369.10  1.99  0.15 
5
th 9.53  1,555.03  37.64  2.42 
6
th 9.10  1,778.47  8.29  0.47 
7
th 3.76  2,027.00  27.78  1.37 
8
th 3.80  2,228.74  30.67  1.38 
9
th 2.58  2,789.23  16.10  0.58 
10
th 0.80  4,470.75  -1.16  -0.03 
Total 8.25  1,376.16  17.96  1.31 
Inequality measures × 100  No MW  MW  Δ absolute  Δ % 
Gini coefficient  28.23  28.19  -0.038  -0.13 
  (27.09; 29.37)  (27.05; 29.33)     
MLD 13.92  13.91  -0.013  -0.09 
  (12.71; 15.13)  (12.69; 15.12)     
Atkinson (ε = 2)  28.13 28.22  0.088 0.31 
  (25.39; 30.88)  (27.62; 31.03)     
  MW of 7.50 € / hour 
 
Persons 
affected by MW 
No MW 
Δ average equivalent income 
Decile  %  € / month  € / month  % 
East  Germany       
1
st 2.37  623.73  44.29  7.10 
2
nd 3.24  721.81  79.28  10.98 
3
rd 23.17  885.49  28.56  3.23 
4
th 33.17  1,045.49  25.99  2.49 
5
th 13.28  1,244.19  21.78  1.75 
6
th 20.04  1,397.72  27.28  1.95 
7
th 12.76  1,571.33  33.13  2.11 
8
th 13.29  1,764.64  35.44  2.01 
9
th 5.19  2,180.57  7.97  0.37 
10
th 9.63  2,645.64  57.05  2.16 
Total 13.63  1,349.34  30.86  2.29 
Inequality measures × 100  No MW  MW  Δ absolute  Δ % 
Gini coefficient  26.89  26.85  -0.048  -0.18 
  (25.52; 28.27)  (25.46; 28.23)    
MLD 12.15  12.12  -0.026  -0.21 
  (10.73; 13.56)  (10.70; 13.54)    
Atkinson (ε = 2)  23.75 23.76  -0.001  -0.00 
  (19.90; 27.61)  (19.89; 27.62)    
Notes:  Deciles for the overall equivalent net income distribution are calculated for the wage structure in 2008 
(without minimum wage) in the respective region. People affected refer to people within a given decile 
of this distribution affected by the minimum wage. % of Δ average income refers to average equivalent 
income in the respective decile and region. Accounting for employment effects of a minimum wage 
means that a fraction of the employed is simulated to become unemployed according to demand side 
constraints of Table 4. Income projections are based on average growth rates. MLD is the mean log de-
viation of equivalent income. The Atkinson inequality measure is calculated for a high degree of ine-
quality aversion (ε = 2). For the exact definition and properties of these inequality measures, see, e.g., 
Cowell (1995). 5%-confidence bands are given in parentheses. 
Source:  Own calculations based on SOEP, wave 2007. 